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ECONOMICS  
AND SOCIAL ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Stagnation of the Russian economy 
lends a new urgency to the question of 
whether reserves of competition incentives 
can be used to overcome the current nega-
tive economic tendencies. The lowering of 
entry barriers is traditionally considered a 
universal instrument of promoting competi-
tion. However, lower entry barriers can be 
mistakenly associated with bringing the 
market closer to the state of the so-called 
‘perfect’ competition. The authors aim to 
show that the absence of entry barriers 
does not improve competition in certain 
markets. On the contrary, it may result in a 
decrease in social welfare. This is particu-
larly true of capital-intensive goods, for 
instance, large diameter pipes for gas pipe-
lines. Lack of proper competition in such 
sectors of the market necessitates entry 
barriers, for they help to achieve a separa-
ting equilibrium at the market. Since there 
are costs associated with creating a sepa-
rating equilibrium, it is necessary to assess 
both costs and benefits of the pooling and 
separating equilibria. 
 
Key words: barriers to entry, compe-
tition policy, industrial policy, adverse 
selection, pooling and separating equilibria 
 
Introduction 
 
Unfavourable macroeconomic indi-
cators caused by a combination of ex-
ternal and internal factors lend a new 
urgency to the problem of using the 
reserves of business competition incen-
tives to overcome recent negative 
trends. Creating conditions for compe-
tition development and activating such 
incentives are typical features of the 
‘new’ industrial policy [12] promoting 
pro-competitive regulation tools. 
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Lowering barriers to entry — import [2; 10], administrative [1], and oth-
er barriers — is traditionally considered an effective pro-competitive meas-
ure. Measures to reduce barriers are a mandatory element of strategic docu-
ments on competition development [6; 14] and they are a permanent item on 
any economic policy agenda. Yet giving absolute priority to lowering barri-
ers to entry and lacking a clear understanding of what barriers to entry are 
(a result of an erroneous interpretation of the basic model of perfect competi-
tion and its prerequisites and opportunities) can have negative consequences. 
Perfect competition is considered as a benchmark not only in theory but 
also in practical, for instance, political decision-making. By default, such 
approach does not have an explicit form. This position — rather harmless 
when theoretical issues are discussed — can lead to problems and significant 
losses for individual groups of market players and the society in general. 
However, this does not exclude redistribution effects in favour of certain 
market players that otherwise would not be part of the market or would have 
entered it much later. 
The absence of barriers to entry is a key feature of perfect competition. 
Technically, easy entry ensures effective resource allocation, since it pre-
vents companies from setting long-term prices exceeding marginal cost to cre-
ate a situation when established companies generate economic rather than ac-
counting profit. Thus, the absence of barriers to entry looks like a promising 
economic policy tool used to create necessary conditions for competition. 
This work aims to explain that the above considerations can be erroneous 
and they can have a negative effect on markets of certain goods. 
The first section strives to answer the question of why barriers to entry 
sometimes do not have an adverse effect on competition and trade perfor-
mance and when such barriers are necessary to achieve efficiency following 
the second-best principle. The second section considers a hypothetical situa-
tion in a market of complex capital-intensive products — large-diameter 
pipes (LDP). LDPs are used in the construction and maintenance of major 
gas pipelines. This industry provides sufficient material for a detailed study 
into the ‘tuning’ of barriers to entry. In less than two decades, Russia made a 
transition from 100 % imports of LDP for major gas pipelines to a market 
that is almost balanced in terms of domestic production. This was the result 
of an entry of four new producers. The most urgent question is whether there 
is a need to increase the production capacities of companies working in the 
Russian market. Should this be a result of an entry of new players? What 
risks will such a policy pose to LDP production1? 
                                                     
1This question is lent urgency by the appearance of new players — Liskimonta-
zhkonstruktsiya, Zagorsky Pipe Plant, and Turboporm — in the market of LDPs 
used in oil and gas pipelines. The state provided support for the constructing of new 
production facilities. Liskimontazhkonstruktsiya and Zagorsky Pipe Plant are in-
cluded in the List of Comprehensive Investment Projects in Priority Areas of Civil 
Industry [5] and they enjoy different forms of public support. According to expert 
estimates, in 2015, the existing production capacities were sufficient to accommo-
date increasing demand. As to the production of thick sheets using 5000 mills, the 
capacity utilisation is close to maximum [4, p. 24]. 
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1. Mixed effect of barriers to entry  
on competition and trade performance 
 
For a long time, economic theory considered barriers a synonym for in-
efficiency. Williamson [7, p. 579] emphasised an increasing tendency to 
view any barriers to entry as harmful to public interest. This assumption left 
room for only one line of economic policy — lowering barriers if they could 
not be eliminated. 
Why do barriers sometimes not have a negative effect on competition 
and trade performance? The general idea is that assessing competition re-
quires examining both current functioning of the market and its long-term 
development prospects. Analysing long-terms prospects is often the only 
way to trace a decline in qualitative parameters of competition if an assess-
ment of current performance leads to a different conclusion. 
Economic theory has developed models proving that barriers to entry are 
not always inefficient from the perspective of public welfare (see, for in-
stance, [20, p. 478]). Economies of scale or a differentiated product will lead 
to an increase in public welfare in many situations if there are barriers to en-
try into a market [28]. In case of economies of scale, which are considered a 
source of barriers to entry in Bain’s interpretation [16], a market consisting 
of several firms with a high operating rate is more publicly efficient than a 
market comprising many firms with a low operation rate. In case of differen-
tiated goods, premium for reputation — reputation being, according to Bain, 
another source of barriers to entry — can become an incentive to enter the 
market and stimulate newcomers to uphold required quality standards. 
Farrell [18] demonstrates that in the markets of experience goods, a 
newcomer has an incentive to offer low-quality products. A rational custom-
er who is aware of this risk will refuse to work with a new supplier. Newco-
mers’ incentives to display opportunistic behaviour and supply low-quality 
goods (moral hazard) depend on the time of entry into the market. Grossman 
and Horn [21] argue that, in a markets of experience goods where estab-
lished players have a reputation and newcomers do not, the attempts to sup-
port newcomers by grants does not only fail to eliminate moral hazard but 
also it can contribute to adverse selection and, thus, lead to a reduction in 
public welfare. Another study [17] shows that unrealistic optimism in new-
comers, which has been described within behaviour economics and observed 
in experiments, prevents entrants from a correct assessment of market oppor-
tunities for profitable functioning. As a result, new entries into a market can 
be excessive. 
As the above studies demonstrate, the two major causes of inefficiency 
of further entries — and thus two sources of the need for effective barriers — 
are the erroneous estimates of market needs (the entry is excessive) and 
problems associated with identifying the quality of goods (the entry is a con-
sequence of unfair competition and it distorts market equilibrium). 
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Below, barriers to entry will be described (1.1) and a typology of goods 
(1.2) and features of entrant behaviour depending on characteristics of goods 
(1.3) presented. 
 
1.1. Barriers to entry 
 
To a first approximation, barriers to entry can be described in terms of 
costs that prevent companies from entering a market. On the other hand, bar-
riers to entry emphasise a certain asymmetry in the position of established 
firms and those outside a market. It is assumed that there are no barriers to 
entry in most cases with the exception of a closed monopoly. However, 
when entering a market, companies are not guided by a comparison of earn-
ings and costs. 
Today, there is no unanimous — or even prevalent — opinion among 
economists as to the definition of barriers to entry. At the same time, barriers 
to entry constitute the central problem of theory of market organisation. In 
particular, McAfee et al. [24] analyse seven definitions most widely used in 
economic literature. It is established that none of them is sufficiently clear or 
operational. 
Some definitions interpret barriers to entry as any costs borne by a firm 
to enter a market. This approach is used by Bain [16, p.3], who emphasises 
that incumbents can use barriers to set and hold prices that exceed costs. Ac-
cording to Bain, barriers to entry are ‘an advantage of established sellers in 
an industry over potential entrant sellers, which is reflected in the extent to 
which established sellers can persistently raise their prices above competitive 
levels without attracting new firms to enter the industry’. 
Others definitions interpret barriers as costs borne by an entrant but not 
an established firm. Consider Sigler’s definition [27, p.67] — ‘a cost of pro-
ducing that must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is 
not borne by firms already in the industry’. 
It is easy to see the difference between these definitions. If a market has 
a certain quality standard that applies to all players, costs associated with 
meeting these requirements will be considered barriers to entry in the first 
case and will not be deemed as such in the second. 
An interesting definition is presented in a work by Franklin M. Fisher 
[19, p. 23] — a barrier to entry is ‘anything that prevents entry when entry is 
socially beneficial’. In effect, this definition acknowledges that the notion of 
‘barriers to entry’ has a gratuitous negative connotation, whereas additional 
entries do not always result in an increase in public welfare. Thus, Fisher 
suggests that only those entry costs be called barriers that are harmful to the 
society, thus implying that there are such obstacles to entry that increase ef-
ficiency. 
The concept of barriers to entry is of crucial significance for assessing 
the state of competition, which serves as an important indicator for making 
regulatory decisions. Thus, decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of 
Russia of April 28, 2010 No. 220 ‘On Establishing the Procedure for Ana-
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lysing the State of Competition in Consumer Markets’ (further referred to as 
Procedure 220) — the principal document regulating market studies for the 
purposes of antimonopoly law enforcement — pays significant attention to 
this issues. In particular, the Procedure 220 considered different types of bar-
riers, including administrative, economic, and strategic ones. All else being 
equal, higher barriers to entry mean a higher probability of restricted compe-
tition. 
For the sake of further discussion, it is important to stress that barriers 
differ depending on the way a company enters a market. 
The first case is the creation of production facilities from scratch as a re-
sult of fixed investment. A new market player joins the existing ones. 
The second case is imports. A producer that has necessary characteristics 
to be included into a market can have experience in manufacturing the prod-
uct in question in other geographical markets. Here, the number of players 
increases but the production output does not (i. e. there is no fixed invest-
ment or the investment is sufficient only to launch trade operations). 
The third case is the expansion of existing production capacities. The 
number of players does not change as it does in the first case and production 
capacities increase without new players, which does not occur in the second 
case. 
Finally, the fourth case is the purchase of a functioning business (which 
can be an instance of capacity expansion) as part of diversification policy. In 
the first approximation, only the owner changes and everything else stays the 
same — at least, in a short-term perspective. 
Below, we will consider the case of a new entry. In this situation, there 
are certain requirements for conformance of goods and the compliance with 
them is controlled through special procedures. 
 
1.2. Typology of goods 
 
Economic theory offers several criteria for classifying goods. Some of 
these criteria can prove useful in discussing the questions above. Firstly, it is 
costs associated with measuring a product’s conformance. Such costs pose 
an obstacle to consumers awareness of the properties of goods2. 
Three categories of goods are identified based on this criterion (see, for 
instance, [13, pp. 283—284]). The first category is search goods. Getting an 
idea of their conformance prior to purchase and exploitation does not require 
significant spending. Strictly speaking, perfect competition — with all nec-
essary reservations — is more applicable to this case than to any other, since 
information on the important conditions of a deal — features of a product — 
is available before the purchase. Obtaining and understanding such infor-
mation does not lead to significant costs. Here, all goods with different fea-
tures but similar functions would form different markets within the relevant 
product boundaries. The second category is so-called experience goods. Be-
                                                     
2 For instance, it is excludability and rivalry in consumption or substitutability and 
complementarity.  
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fore purchase and exploitation, costs associated with assessing a product’s 
conformance are high (full costs, including the risk of obtaining a low-qua-
lity item). Finally, the third type of goods is so-called credence goods. A con-
sumer cannot easily estimate the conformance of such goods even after the 
beginning (sometimes, even the end) of exploitation. 
The above does not mean that no type of goods can be assessed before 
purchase and the beginning of exploitation. This only means that, for in-
stance, assessing the quality of an experience good requires tests of an accu-
rate sample conducted by experts using necessary equipment, which is of 
crucial importance in the case of mass production. Moreover, not all tests 
reduce the risk of obtaining low-quality items. 
 
1.3. Moral hazard and adverse selection 
 
The above classification makes it possible to identify a number of situa-
tions when trading goods in accordance with the perfect competition princi-
ples can lead to consequence that are less favourable than those that would 
arise otherwise. Note that, in this case, freedom of entry into a market means 
the absence or insignificance of barriers, whereas other conditions — for 
instance, perfect information — are not taken into account. 
If the quality of a product is difficult to assess before consumption, the 
manufacturer can feel tempted to present low-quality goods as high-quality 
ones and set a higher price for them. In effect, such a player strives to use the 
reputation of established companies free of charge. However, for the latter, 
reputation is not a free good but rather a result of investment. This phenom-
enon is an instance of so-called moral hazard, whose effects and minimisa-
tion conditions have been discussed in economic literature over several dec-
ades. It develops in the following conditions: 
— if customers do not have a reliable benchmark to range suppliers by 
the quality of produce; 
— if an entrant is not ready for a long-term work in the market (or they 
hope to position the good differently in the future); 
— if the technology cannot guarantee a high quality of each item and ac-
ceptable average quality can be a result of a wide dispersion in conformance 
characteristics of individual items; 
In the third case, even purchasing a faulty product does not mean that the 
customer can reliably estimate whether the low quality of the time is a result 
of the supplier’s negligence or this outcome is possible when using a cutting-
edge technology. Mechanisms to resolve this problem include certification 
of both products and processes by a second or third party (for more detail, 
see [8]). 
Adverse selection [15] is a result of opportunistic behaviour of sellers 
and it can be a by-product of the moral hazard problem. Let us imagine a 
situation when two competitors produce and sell the same good. Before ex-
ploitation, customers are not aware of the conformance of a certain item. 
However, there is information on the probability distribution of purchases of 
certain quality arranged by manufacturer or by batch. One seller cuts costs 
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and supplies a seemingly high-quality but, in effect, low-quality good (the 
problem of the test agent, methods, and costs requires additional discussion). 
The other seller does not cut costs and upholds necessary standards. 
All else being equal, customers will be guided by the expected perfor-
mance characteristics that are superior to those of a good offered by a negli-
gent seller and inferior to those of a scrupulous manufacturer. Thus, the price 
a customer will be ready to pay for a good with expected performance char-
acteristics will be profitable for the first manufacturer but not for the second 
one. The second manufacturer will incur losses. In such a situation, only 
negligent manufacturers might remain in the market, which is the essence of 
the adverse selection problem. This is an instance of a wide definition of a 
market within product boundaries, which is used for the purposes of antimo-
nopoly law enforcement and is based — although implicitly — on the pool-
ing equilibrium principle. The reason behind it is that buyers consider such 
goods as substitutes. Moreover, relevant discussions never address the be-
havioural component, which can be of significance in the absence of reliable 
information on probability distribution in a market where both low- and 
high-quality products are traded (in particular, this can be a case of unrealis-
tic optimism). 
In other words, low barriers to entry and/or a broad definition of a mar-
ket’s product boundaries can be associated with the nature of contracts cor-
responding to the conditions of pooling equilibrium, whereas barriers to en-
try and/or a narrow definition of product boundaries with the conditions of 
separating equilibrium. 
Moreover, pooling equilibrium does not immediately suggest inefficien-
cy. Sometimes contract administration is easier in such a situation and losses 
stemming from hidden characteristics are insignificant. In other words, it is 
important to consider at least three aspects: (1) the scale of distribution of 
products with hidden substandard characteristics; (2) side-effects of identify-
ing quality faults during exploitation (for instance, in the case of an acci-
dent); (3) costs associated with creating and applying institutional mecha-
nisms aimed to reduce the risk of purchasing a faulty product. 
Therefore, adverse selection is a result of asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information suggests that a buyer invokes contract terms in in-
teractions with a counteragent (manufacturer) based on expected values ra-
ther than observed characteristics, which leads to cross subsidisation of low-
quality producers by high-quality producers. 
Another possible result is deteriorating competition conditions despite a 
formal increase in the number of players and a reduction in market concen-
tration (this is often considered a relevant characteristic of the competition 
level). In a long-term perspective, forcing high-quality product manufactur-
ers out of the market can result in even worse competition conditions. Such 
manufacturers can be forced out by established sellers that have changed 
their strategy towards economising on quality. As a result, customer gains 
will diminish and the market will degenerate. 
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Different methods are applied to overcome the problem of adverse selec-
tion. They involve creating special institutional mechanisms aimed at adjust-
ing the incentives for sellers in such a way that a buyer will have an oppor-
tunity to distinguish between manufacturers of high- and low-quality prod-
ucts (separating equilibrium). However, the ultimate goal is to prevent sup-
pliers of low-quality products from entering into a market (economic barriers 
to entry) and force them out of a market or localise them within a market 
with customers with lower requirements to product performance. The most 
popular method to solve the problem of information asymmetry is employ-
ing institutional mechanisms for market signalling and screening. 
There are two important limitations to this discussion: (1) one should 
presume that one limitation to entry is never better than another one (there is 
no need to prove comparative effectiveness); (2) the absence of barriers to 
entry has advantages under certain conditions (a small and not increasing 
proportion of substandard produce and the absence of significant negative 
side-effects). 
 
2. Barriers to entry into a market of complex capital-intensive products:  
The redundant and the necessary 
 
A market where the above risks are posed by the product and production 
features is that of complex capital-intensive products. Recently, such mar-
kets have attracted attention of antimonopoly bodies. In 2011—2013, Rus-
sia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service initiated two notable investigations in 
the markets of large diameter pipes for constructing major gas pipelines. The 
results were ambiguous [3; 11; 9]. The attention paid to this industry by reg-
ulatory agencies can suggest that competition in this market is considered 
underdeveloped (the correlation of perceived and actual competition is a 
problem that requires further research). This makes it possible to impose 
competition policy measures, including creating barriers. When applied to 
markets of complex capital-intensive products, in particular, LDPs, the 
above theoretical consideration will read as follows. 
As a rule, new entries into a market or a threat of such entries are con-
sidered as a disciplinary factor that inhibits price growth and encourages in-
cumbents to uphold quality standards, introduce innovations, etc. However, 
the existing LDP market data suggest that certain characteristics create a risk 
of negative effects from entry. 
1. A market is balanced by internal production (even without the partici-
pation of importers) and there are significant economies of scale. In this 
case, a new entry will increase costs for all producers (the capacity utilisa-
tion will diminish) and lead to price growth. A new player can be unrealisti-
cally optimistic, which will lead to a failure and sunk costs will become an-
other loss for public welfare. Although this hypothesis is not self-evident 
from the perspective of traditional models of market organisation theories, 
unrealistic optimism effects have been studied for a long time within behav-
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ioural economics [23; 25; 26; 29] and recently within market organisation 
theory [17; 22]. 
2. The quality of a product is difficult to estimate before consumption. In 
markets of experience goods, new players have an incentive to take ad-
vantage of the reputation of established companies, presenting low-quality 
goods as high quality ones and setting higher prices for them. This scenario 
is most probable in the case when buyers do not have special competences to 
assess the quality with reasonable transaction costs, nor do they have access 
to the assessments of independent companies. A number of characteristics 
are considered crucial for the pipe industry. These are the constrained yield 
stress, ultimate stress limit, permanent elongation, amount of absorbed ener-
gy, expanding coefficient, and out-of-roundness. For instance, deviations 
from permitted absorbed energy parameters can result in the destruction of 
dozens of kilometres of a pipeline if an accident takes place [8, p. 35—36]. 
In the short term, this can lead to a drop in prices but, in the long term, 
sellers of the highest-quality products will be gradually forced out of the 
market until only low-quality products remain. In such case, an industry can 
disappear with all its technology and it is needless to say that the costs of 
repairing the damage from using low-quality products can be rather high. 
This holds especially true for hazardous objects, such as major pipelines. 
Pipes are expected not only to withstand a pressure of several dozens of at-
mospheres3 but also to be resistant to an aggressive environment (extreme 
temperatures, saline water, and mechanical impacts). 
There are different ways to limit new entries. However, limits to entry 
cannot be considered as a means to attain a desired level of competition. In 
other words, structural alternatives to limits to entry are not identical from 
the perspective of expected results. For instance, the requirement, that en-
trants should have a significant experience in supplying goods to a certain 
market or a certain customer, seems to contain a contradiction and it can 
serve as a negative example. One of the explanations is the artificial asym-
metry between established and aspiring companies. Theoretically, there is a 
possible response — an entrant can purchase an established producer paying 
the latter part of the expected additional gain (this variant was described 
above). 
Nevertheless, this gives rise to a question as to whether the history of re-
lations between a certain supplier and a customer is of any significance. If it 
is not, all conditions should be unified. However, in this case, one must also 
agree that reputation does not mean anything. If it is, assessing concrete risks 
based on a supplier’s past behaviour and current technology can become an 
important benchmark for differentiating relations with suppliers (in this case, 
differentiation does not equal discrimination). Of course, it is still necessary 
to answer the question as to whether such differentiation is admissible. Are 
there any separating benchmarks that meet minimum reliability requirements 
or one should bear the costs associated with pooling equilibrium? This ques-
                                                     
3 In the Nord Stream, the working pressure can reach 200 atm. See, for instance, 
http://www.gazprominfo.ru/terms/gas-main/ 
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tion is open to discussion, as well as that as to how to understand whether 
there is a need to change the existing requirements for information on prod-
uct performance and conformance in the framework of complex projects 
and, if so, how and at whose expense. 
Thus, preventing adverse selection requires distinguishing between: 
(1) differentiating practices relating to a producer’s reputation in a 
relevant market (but not a supply history); 
(2) universal requirements applicable to all players (they can differ from 
those in other, for instance, foreign markets). 
 
Conclusions 
 
With a significant asymmetry of information between a customer and a 
supplier as to the product quality, the risk of adverse selection can have a 
dramatic effect on the assessment of effectiveness and desirability of barriers 
to entry into such a market. The more serious the possible consequences of 
deviations from the expected quality (for instance, in the case of an accident, 
which can be fatal at a hazardous object, such as a major gas pipeline), the 
more reasons there are to believe that information disclosure is economically 
justified. One indirect indicator, if any, is the cost of insurance. Such re-
quirements are a key tool for achieving the so-called separating equilibrium. 
In such case, suppliers of substandard products can secure a certain niche but 
they will not be able to compete for orders with strict requirements. This 
phenomenon can be presented in terms of vertical differentiation of a prod-
uct with unrequited differences in quality. 
Achieving a separating equilibrium is not automatic. The market pa-
rameters described above require that a customer (the principal, non-
informed party) take efforts to create incentives for a supplier (the agent, in-
formed party) to act in line with the principal’s actions. At a glance, both a 
customer and a seller of a high-quality product can benefit from a separating 
equilibrium. However, this poses the following questions: 
(1) how customers can understand that they are dealing with a seller of a 
high-quality product and 
(2) how separating equilibrium costs can be distributed — through 
creating necessary institutional frameworks, including earlier lacking 
infrastructure markets — to ensure independent quality control, monitoring, 
damage assessment, etc. 
Analysing effectiveness of barriers to entry into complex capital-
intensive product markets in terms of creating economic and industrial poli-
cy benchmarks suggests that, depending on market characteristics, certain 
barriers can ensure fair competition. Thus, an easy entry into a market and 
relevant public support will create a risk of industry degeneration from the 
perspective of public welfare. 
However, it is also important to stress that an absence of barriers to entry 
can be beneficial in certain conditions. In particular, creating a system of 
barriers is not free. The corresponding costs should be borne by someone. 
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Cost distribution is also of significance. The costs should be compared 
against the possible negative consequences of the absence of barriers. It was 
shown in the case of the LDP market which aspects deserved increased at-
tention in the context of competition and industrial policy measures aimed to 
overcome the problem of distorted incentives and optimise the transaction 
cost system relating to the assessment of product quality. 
Although barriers to entry into markets have been extensively studied 
within market organisation theory, they have been rarely paired with the 
problem of pooling/separating equilibrium in the conditions of information 
asymmetry or that of competitive and industrial policy, which is extremely 
important for countries with a transitional economy. Studying barriers to en-
try within such contexts is a very promising area of research that can yield 
not only new theoretical models but also empirical estimates based on the 
material that is not adequate for such purposes. 
Although this article focused on analysing discrete alternatives to effec-
tive barriers to entry in the context of emergence of new market players, an 
increase in the number of players is not the ultimate goal (as this work ar-
gues), nor is it the only way to develop an industry. If the government con-
siders it necessary to support an industry, selecting suitable public support 
measures should include choosing between alternatives of a higher level. In 
particular, it is important to answer the questions whether only new players 
can count on support or established companies can also receive it and 
whether it is necessary to employ the mechanisms of a vertical industrial 
policy in view of its possible distortive effect on competition. Probably, bet-
ter results can be achieved through pursuing a horizontal policy — although 
it can prove to be costlier. Finally, the logic of assessing regulatory effects 
suggests that any discussion of public support measures should be based on 
the principle of preferred governmental non-interference. This requires esti-
mating gains, costs, and risks of preserving the status quo as another discrete 
alternative. The absence of a comprehensive assessments results in a risk of 
the ineffective use of public funds in the cases when problems could be 
solved without public support, as well as a risk of inconsistency between the 
chosen mechanisms and declared goals in view of potential indirect effects. 
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